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4 August 1950

MEMORANDUM TO FILES

SUBJECT: Report of Conference with Strategic Air Command, June 20, 1950.

1. Upon the arrival of [] (OPC), and the undersigned at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Omaha, Nebraska, we were introduced to Lt. Col. Stampedos (C. O., Survival Training School, SAC, Camp Carson, Colorado). Colonel Stampedos had been advised of our mission and had intended to discuss his communications requirements with us. Colonel Stampedos, however, had to attend a staff meeting with the officials of SAC and members of this organization (OSO and OPC). [] and the undersigned were put in contact with Captain Queseda (Chief, Electronics Requirements Section, SAC).

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2. In discussion with Captain Queseda, it was pointed out that the purpose of the visit of [] and the undersigned was to discuss the problems of communications for downed SAC air crews and, upon the basis of that discussion, make available to SAC (subject to higher authority approval) the benefit of knowledge acquired by CIA. It was explained that CIA had developed equipment, procedures, training, etc., and in the course of development had learned much that SAC or Air Materiel Command could benefit by. It was pointed out that our understanding of this particular SAC communication problem made it apparent that CIA had similar communications problems. In this regard, knowledge gained in solving our problems should interest SAC. It was further pointed out that CIA could not and would not undertake development of SAC's equipment but would, should SAC desire it, offer practical advice for SAC to use as it saw fit. Captain Queseda then reviewed SAC's communications problem for downed air crews as follows:

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In accomplishing the basic mission of strategic bombing of the enemy's war potential, it was obvious that a percentage of aircraft casualties was involved. These casualties would take place in such form as to introduce into enemy held territory highly trained, invaluable U. S. Air Force personnel. For the purposes of morale and to conserve as much of this highly trained group as possible, SAC proposed to equip each operational aircraft with a number of light weight radio sets that would enable the downed crew to establish contact with peripheral bases and arrange for air evacuation of these groups.

3. The requirements, or program, as outlined above were discussed in general for a brief period, at which point Captain Queseda showed a letter listing the technical requirements for the proposed SAC radio set. These requirements were prepared by W/O Hansen (Communications Officer, SAC Survival Training School, Camp Carson, Colorado), after discussion with a

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member of this organization [redacted] It was indicated that although [redacted] and myself personally thought that the requirements were high, we would defer to an engineering analysis of these requirements. It was asked if it might be possible to have a SAC Commo representative discuss these requirements with a CIA communications engineer prior to submission to Director of Requirements, Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, so that these requirements would be more in line with what our engineering department had found to be possible. It was stated that this discussion might prevent unnecessary delay in Air Force equipment development. Captain Queseda was enthusiastic regarding any assistance we might be able to offer and proposed that we take a copy of the technical requirements for the equipment with us for engineering evaluation. A copy of the technical requirements is attached.

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4. Captain Queseda also indicated inadvertently, the lack of detailed planning that has accompanied this project to date. While the Air Force has developed equipment requirements, they have not as yet even considered operational procedures and modus operandi for the secure use of this equipment. We indicated generally that a multitude of problems involving training, base and field security, base stations, etc., existed, and that CIA might also assist in the solving of these problems. At this point the meeting with Captain Queseda was terminated.

5. In later discussion with Colonel Stampedos, a review of the points covered with Captain Queseda was given and Colonel Stampedos also was enthusiastic regarding CIA assistance. It developed that Colonel Stampedos was a wartime member of OSS and was very much aware of the problems involving low power clandestine communications and, further, that he sincerely felt that CIA had much to offer. He stated he was proceeding to Camp Carson to discuss equipment requirement changes that had been made at SAC Headquarters by Captain Queseda. If W/O Hansen agrees to these changes, Colonel Stampedos will arrange to have W/O Hansen contact CIA for further discussion. If W/O Hansen does not agree with the changes, he will proceed to SAC Headquarters, settle his differences with Captain Queseda, and then contact CIA for further discussion.

6. At this point Colonel Stampedos indicated he was highly pleased with the services of [redacted] during the latter's visit to Camp Carson, and that he would like the services of a CIA Communications Operations Officer for his Camp Carson School. (This apparently was discussed in the staff meeting which [redacted] and I did not attend, so I would not be surprised if a request for this officer is forthcoming.) It was pointed out to Colonel Stampedos that at this time CIA was short of the type of communications operations officer he was asking for, but that the matter would be brought up at our headquarters. At this point, in an off-the-record manner, we told Colonel Stampedos that CIA was interested in establishing a testing

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unit where equipment could be tested under field conditions. While not empowered to commit CIA, it might possibly be that an operations officer established with this unit could be available to Colonel Stampedos provided the field test unit was located in Camp Carson. Colonel Stampedos was very enthusiastic. He stated that at any time he is prepared to furnish buildings, quarters, personnel facilities, mess, etc., transportation and complete freedom of movement within camp. While assuring the Colonel that this was not a definite commitment on our part we asked how binding his statements might be should we decide to take him up on it. The Colonel stated that he has the authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the establishment of his school and the "Old Man's" (Lt. Gen. LeMay) approval to do what he deems necessary with no questions asked.

7. At this point, Colonel Stampedos asked if we could present ourselves in the SAC War Room and announce our findings and recommendations to the assembled brass (highest rank--full colonel, head of SAC A-2, Colonel Ems.) Upon presentation of the points covered specifically above, the Air Force seemed slightly dismayed that we considered the problem so complex. Upon hearing that CIA trained its own base operators specifically for clandestine circuits, in spite of the fact that these men were qualified radio operators to begin with, they appeared surprised and made queries as to the reason for this. They were quite chagrined to find that we considered a "point-to-point" operator as generally being incapable of operating a clandestine circuit. When queried further, we stated that the base operator must be good to copy the signals he is working with in the first place, and, secondly, must think for the poorly trained man who is operating the other end of the circuit. (NOTE: At this point [redacted] of OPC volunteered to take over all SAC communications requirements for downed air crews. SAC did not seem pleased with this proposal and the matter was quickly dropped.

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8. In general, SAC A-2 officials seemed to think that they could derive much benefit from active liaison with CIA on communications problems. Beyond this, the undersigned has no means of determining how far or how active this liaison may go. It would appear, however, that Lt. Gen. LeMay has ordered SAC to do something regarding downed air crews. While it might be uncomplimentary, the undersigned definitely had the impression that the whole effort seemed to be more toward pleasing General LeMay as soon as possible, than solving the problem. It also appears that, in view of the preceding, any advice given by CIA should be forthcoming as expeditiously and as concisely as possible. Should any dilatory action result, the Air Force, I am certain, will take their problems elsewhere and solve them unilaterally at tremendous expense to the U. S. Government.

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